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Recent Developments 
LEE v. CLINE: 
The Maryland Tort Claims Act Broadens the Scope of Qualified 
Immunity Afforded to State Personnel to Encompass Both 
Intentional Torts and Constitutional Torts 
By: Stephanie Freer 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that qualified 
immunity afforded to state personnel under the Maryland Tort Claims 
Act (MTCA) encompasses both intentional torts and constitutional 
torts. Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 863 A.2d 297 (2004). In a case of 
first impression, the court concluded the MTCA insulates state 
personnel from all types of tort claims absent a sufficient showing of 
actual malice. !d. at 253, 863 A.2d at 302. 
On the morning of March 12, 1994, Keith Lee ("Lee"), an 
African-American, left his home in Maryland to run various errands in 
his BMW automobile. Lee made several stops, one of which was at a 
car wash. Sometime later, Lee noticed his car's front license plate was 
missing and correctly surmised the plate had come off at the car wash. 
When he returned to retrieve it, the plate was so mangled he was 
unable to re-attach it. Lee placed the plate on the rear floor of the car 
behind the driver's seat and continued his errands. 
At 3:00 p.m., while Lee was still running errands, Frederick 
County Deputy Sheriff Gary Cline ("Cline") pulled him over. Cline 
told Lee he stopped Lee because his front license plate was missing. 
Lee explained the plate had fallen off at the car wash and showed 
Cline the mangled plate. Cline then asked Lee to consent to a vehicle 
search for illegal narcotics and weapons but Lee refused. Cline 
subsequently ran a check on Lee's plate. Cline was informed that 
Lee's plate was valid and that Lee had no points on his license or a 
criminal record. Despite this information, Cline requested a canine 
unit, and upon arrival, the canine circled Lee's car indicating there was 
no sign of drugs. 
Lee filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Frederick County 
against Cline alleging he was detained and searched because the 
Frederick County Sheriffs Department targets African-American 
males who drive expensive cars. Lee's complaint further stated that at 
no time did Cline have probable cause and that Cline's acts amounted 
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to an unreasonable search and setzure m violation of his state 
constitutional rights. 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Cline, 
finding no violation of Lee's state constitutional rights. The lower 
court determined that Cline had qualified immunity under the MTCA 
with regard to non-constitutional tort claims and that Lee presented no 
evidence of malice to overcome that privilege. Lee appealed to the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, which affirmed the trial court's 
findings. The Court of Appeals granted Lee's writ of certiorari to 
determine whether the MTCA grants qualified immunity to state 
personnel for tort actions based upon both violations of the state 
constitution and common law intentional torts. 
The court initially looked to the ordinary and natural meaning 
of the language of the statute. !d. at 253, 863 A.2d at 302. 
Specifically, the MTCA provides, "state personnel shall have 
immunity from liability described under § 5-522(b) of the Courts and 
Judicial Proceedings Article." !d. That section provides immunity 
from liability in tort to state personnel so long as the acts or omissions 
are within the scope of public duty and made without malice or gross 
negligence. !d. 
The court determined that it had not directly decided whether 
the MTCA actually covers intentional torts and constitutional torts. 
From an initial plain reading of the statute, the MTCA appeared to 
cover intentional torts and constitutional torts so long as committed 
within the scope of state employment and without malice or gross 
negligence. !d. at 256, 863 A.2d at 304. 
Despite the statutory language, Lee argued immunity granted 
by the MTCA should have no application to state constitutional or 
intentional torts. !d. at 258, 863 A.2d at 305. Lee based his argument 
on grounds that Maryland has consistently held common law qualified 
immunity has no application in tort actions based upon alleged 
violations of state constitutional rights or upon intentional torts. !d. 
Nonetheless, the court distinguished Maryland's common law 
qualified immunity doctrine for public officials from that of the 
MTCA. !d. at 259, 863 A.2d at 306. 
The purpose of the Maryland public official immunity 
principle, the court reasoned, is to ensure that public officials, in the 
performance of "important public dut[ies] ha[ve] the freedom and 
authority to make decisions and choices." !d. at 260-61, 863 A.2d at 
306. Thus, the court found, the defense of public official immunity is 
very narrow and generally applies only to negligent acts. !d. 
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In contrast, the court established that the MTCA generally 
insulates state employees from tort liability if their actions are within 
the scope of employment and without malice or gross negligence. Id. 
at 261, 863 A.2d at 307. This broader purpose wholly applies to non-
malicious intentional torts and constitutional torts. !d. 
Another distinction between public official immunity and the 
MTCA is significant with regard to constitutional torts. !d. at 262, 863 
A.2d at 307. The court found that a substantial difference exists 
between public official immunity and the immunity granted by the 
MTCA. !d. This distinction is based squarely on Article 19 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights ("Article 19"), which provides the 
right to every person, for any injury done to their person or property, 
to seek available remedies from the court. Id. In support of this 
principle in Weyler v. Gibson, 110 Md. 636, 73 A. 261 (1909), the 
court staunchly declined to extend state governmental immunity to 
public officials breaching citizens' constitutional rights. !d. at 263, 863 
A.2d at 308. 
As to non-constitutional tort actions, the court concluded that 
the effect of Article 19 is somewhat more elastic. The test is one of 
reasonableness. Id. at 264, 863 A.2d at 308. Article 19 provides a 
degree of constitutional protection even for causes of action not based 
on constitutional rights if there is an unreasonable restriction upon 
one's ability to seek redress for their injuries. Id. at 265, 863 A.2d at 
309. For this reason, the court has consistently held that the legislature 
has the authority to substitute state liability for individual employee 
liability. !d. Since MTCA substitution process is identical to that 
authorized by the legislature, the court found that the requirements of 
Article 19 were satisfied. !d. at 266, 863 A.2d at 310. 
Nevertheless, a sufficient showing of malice will overcome 
qualified immunity afforded to state personnel under the MTCA. Id. 
at 268, 863 A.2d at 311. In Shoemaker v. Smith, 353 Md. 143, 725 
A.2d 549 (1999), the court defined "actual malice" as "conduct 
characterized by evil or wrongful motive, intent to injure, knowing and 
deliberate wrongdoing, ill-will or fraud." !d. The court applied this 
definition in Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 7 57 A.2d 118 (2000), 
finding that intent and motive are vital elements in the determination 
of whether malice is shown. Id. at 269s, 863 A.2d at 311. In the 
instant case, the court concluded the facts, like those in Okwa, 
supported an inference of Cline's ill-will; as such, the issue of malice 
generated a jury question. !d. at 270, 863 A.2d at 312. 
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The holding in this case broadens the scope of the MTCA by 
affording qualified immunity to state personnel in all types of tort 
claims unless there is an ample showing of malice. Where the MTCA 
previously only provided immunity with regard to non-constitutional 
tort claims, it is likely that this decision will further insulate state-
employed tortfeasors from responsibility while drastically reducing the 
ability of aggrieved parties to seek redress for a violation of their 
fundamental rights. 
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